The black paper of quantum cryptography: real implementation problems by Scarani, Valerio & Kurtsiefer, Christian
ar
X
iv
:0
90
6.
45
47
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
0 A
pr
 20
12
The black paper of quantum cryptography: real implementation problems
Valerio Scarani, Christian Kurtsiefer
Centre for Quantum Technologies & Department of Physics, National University of Singapore, Singapore
(Dated: April 23, 2012)
The laws of physics play a crucial role in the security of quantum key distribution (QKD). This fact
has often been misunderstood as if the security of QKD would be based only on the laws of physics.
As the experts know well, things are more subtle. We review the progresses in practical QKD
focusing on (I) the elements of trust that are common to classical and quantum implementations
of key distribution; and (II) some threats to security that have been highlighted recently, none of
which is unredeemable (i.e., in principle QKD can be made secure). This leads us to guess that the
field, similar to non-quantum modern cryptography, is going to split in two directions: those who
pursue practical devices may have to moderate their security claims; those who pursue ultimate
security may have to suspend their claims of usefulness.
I. INTRODUCTION
In their seminal 1984 paper [1], Bennett and Bras-
sard argued that some basic laws of physics may
prove useful in cryptographic tasks. They consid-
ered first the task of key distribution between distant
partners and noticed that quantum signals are ideal
trusted couriers: if the eavesdropper Eve tries to
obtain some information, her action cannot remain
concealed, because measurement modifies the state
or, equivalently, because of the no-cloning theorem.
In the second part of their paper, they turned to the
task of bit-commitment and proposed a quantum so-
lution relying on entanglement. In 1991, Ekert in-
dependently re-discovered quantum key distribution
[2]: his intuition was based on entanglement, more
specifically on Bell’s inequalities. These two works
are the milestones of the field, even if precursors for
these ideas had been brought up [3].
The fact that security is based on physical laws lead
to the hope that quantum cryptography may pro-
vide the highest possible level of security, namely
security against an adversary with unrestricted com-
putational power; in the jargon, unconditional secu-
rity. Further research vindicated only one of the
two conjectures of Bennett and Brassard: key dis-
tribution can indeed be made unconditionally secure
[4–6], while bit commitment cannot [7]. Most of the
subsequent developments in quantum cryptography
have therefore been devoted to quantum key distri-
bution (QKD); several review papers are available
[8–11].
II. QUANTUM SIGNALS AS
INCORRUPTIBLE COURIERS
Even before unconditional security was technically
proved, “security based on the laws of physics” be-
came the selling slogan of QKD. It’s catchy, and
it can be understood correctly — but it may also
be understood wrongly and has often been explic-
itly spelled out as “security based only on the laws
of physics”. Of course, a pause of reflection shows
that the statement cannot possibly be as strong as
that. For instance, the laws of physics do not pre-
vent someone from reading the outcomes of a de-
tector; however, if the adversary has access to that
information, security is clearly compromised! But
many people were just carried away by the power of
the slogan — fair enough, this does not happen only
with QKD.
On the wings of enthusiasm, some promoters of
QKD also managed to convey the impression that
they were presenting the solution for (almost) ev-
ery task of secret communication. This may have
impressed some sponsors. However, the main result
was to alienate a great part of the community of ex-
perts in classical cryptography, who, unfamiliar with
quantum physics though they may be, could not fail
to spot the overstatement. Fortunately, several ex-
perts of QKD, well aware of the real scope of their
research, managed to re-establish a constructive di-
alog. Both the interest and the niche character of
QKD are generally admitted today.
In fact, the understanding of the niche character
of QKD immediately clarifies the role of the laws
of physics as well. The SECOQC White Paper of
2007 [12] convincingly argued that QKD is a form
of “trusted courier” i.e. a potential solution for those
tasks, for which a trusted courier may be useful. For
instance, if one can guarantee that a one-time pad
key has not been revealed during its exchange, then
the secret is guaranteed also in the future: this is an
advantage over complexity-based schemes [13]. Now,
with human couriers, we are fairly familiar. Suppose
Alice creates a one-time pad key on her computer,
burn it on a DVD and entrust to a human courier
Charlie the task of bringing it to Bob. Alice should
be confident that
(i) her computer and Bob’s are not leaking infor-
mation, by themselves of through active hack-
ing;
(ii) Charlie is honest at the moment of receiving
the key from Alice;
(iii) During his travel from Alice to Bob, Charlie
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leak out inadvertently.
Replacing Charlie with quantum couriers, one does
not have to worry about (iii) anymore: the laws of
physics guarantee it; but they don’t guarantee (i) and
(ii). Indeed, it’s pretty obvious that (i) must be
enforced also for QKD. As for (ii), a “dishonest”
quantum courier would be a quantum signal whose
state has not been accurately characterized.
Still, one may think that the danger of (i) and (ii)
does not extend beyond caricature examples: “Sure
enough, if Eve can see Alice through a window...;
sure enough, if the source produces always two pho-
tons instead of one... But one can easily check for
such blunders”. Unfortunately, exactly the opposite
is the case: blunders affecting the security through
failures of (i) or (ii) may be numerous and very
subtle; most of the recent developments in practi-
cal QKD have to do with those concerns, as we are
going to show in the next Section.
Before that, we want to stress an important, though
quite obvious, issue: in this paper, we review the
development of practical QKD. However, since as-
sumptions (i) and (ii) are common for quantum and
classical couriers, classical implementations must be
checked as well for similar blunders. In other words,
we are by no means implying that QKD would be
more problematic than classical cryptography. In
fact, QKD does have an advantage over classical
methods, namely (iii).
III. ALL THAT THE LAWS OF PHYSICS
DON’T TAKE CARE OF
A. Problems at preparation
We begin by examining the need for a careful assess-
ment of the properties of the courier. Here is a list
of examples. Note that most of them refer to im-
plementations with weak coherent pulses: probably
not because they are much worse than others, but
because they have been scrutinized more thoroughly.
1. Problem: attenuated laser pulses are not single
photons, multi-photon components are impor-
tant [14]. Solutions: adapt the security proofs
to take the effect into account [15], or change
the protocol [16, 17] or of course change the
source.
2. Problem: successive pulses emitted by a laser
are generally not independent, they may have
phase coherence [18]. Solution: adapt the se-
curity proofs (not done at the moment of writ-
ing) or actively randomize the phase.
3. Problem: in the so-called “plug-and-play” im-
plementations (the ones chosen for several
commercial setups), photons do a round trip:
Alice’s device must receive light, code it and
resend it [19]. But then, one must assume
that the photons that enter Alice’s lab might
have been prepared by Eve [20]. Solution: add
attenuation and active phase randomization,
then use a suitable security proof [21].
4. Problem: in continuous-variables QKD, if the
local oscillator travels between Alice and Bob,
the implementation is completely insecure un-
less Bob monitors the intensity [22]. Solution:
add a beam-splitter and monitor the intensity.
5. Problem: in some implementations, the differ-
ent letters of the QKD alphabet are prepared
by different light sources [23]. Each source may
have its own fingerprint: for instance, even if
coding is supposed to be in polarization, differ-
ent sources may have different spectra. Also,
minor initial or temperature-dependent differ-
ences in the electric driving circuitry of each
source may go undetected in normal operation
or assembly of the setup, but certainly leave
a temporal fingerprint in the transmitted sig-
nal. Solution: no miracle solution exists, one
has to characterize the sources and bound the
possible leakage of information.
B. Problems at detection
Let us now review some examples of the problems
at the level of detection. One such problem (ad-
mittedly, an anecdotal one) was stressed in the very
first demonstration experiment presented by Ben-
nett and coworkers [24]: the Pockels cells used to
select the bases were driven by high-voltage devices,
which made an audible sound depending on the ba-
sis or letter selection. Someone said that the de-
vice provided “unconditional security against a deaf
eavesdropper”: a joke... or a prophetic insight in the
fate of practical QKD?
1. Problem: an example of leakage of classical in-
formation explores parasitic properties of de-
tectors. It is known that, upon detection, Sil-
icon avalanche photodetectors emit light due
to hot carrier recombination. This light may
leak out through the optical channel, revealing
which detector has fired [25]. Solution: other
photo-diodes have been tested and no such
back-flashing was detected (of course, these
studies rely on the assumption that the de-
vices used to probe for such radiation capture
any sensibly accessible wavelength range).
2. Problem: in “plug-and-play” systems, as men-
tioned, Alice’s device is open to receive pho-
tons, before coding and resending them. The
3eavesdropper may implement a Trojan horse
attack to probe Alice’s phase modulator: send
in light (say at a different wavelength) and
collect it back, coded. Solution: because the
setup involves attenuators, the additional light
that is sent in should be quite intense; a pro-
portional detector is then added at the en-
trance of the setup, which should detect un-
usually strong signals [26].
3. Problem: light fields (’faked states’) can be
generated which force at least some of the com-
mon detectors to produce outcomes resembling
those corresponding to the detection of sin-
gle photons [27]. This may be exploited to
implement something similar to a man-in-the-
middle attack. Solution: depends on the de-
tails of the implementation.
4. Problem: photodetectors may also be manip-
ulated to change their timing behaviour [28],
such that the detection time is partly corre-
lated with the detection outcome. An exper-
imental evaluation of this leakage channel be-
came known as the time-shift attack [29]. So-
lution: check that all the detectors have the
same timing statistics.
5. Problem: in a similar fashion, communication
of detection times (necessary in any scenario
with a lossy communication channel) with a
too high accuracy may reveal substantial in-
formation about the measurement results, just
due imbalanced electronic delays and/or detec-
tor parameter scatter [30]. Solution: do not
reveal too many digits of your detection times.
C. A balance
Just as in every field, there have been sheer mis-
takes in practical QKD: using an inadequate secu-
rity bound (see below), neglecting to authenticate
the classical channel, and the like. The problems
reviewed above, however, do not belong to that cat-
egory: each of them has been the object of a real
discovery.
The positive side of it all is that, once identified, each
of those problems can be solved: thanks to these
discoveries, the security of implementations has in-
creased over the years. Another good piece of news
is that, in spite of serious scrutinizing, there is no
hint of a threat that would compromise the secu-
rity of QKD in an irredeemable way. But there is a
negative side to it: before being identified, each of
the problems above represented a serious potential
breach of security. It is a truism to stress that we
may not be aware of similar problems, which have
not been discovered yet.
We come to the bottom line of this section. We
believe that this state of affairs cannot be simply
dismissed with a “there have been examples of bad
design of the device”. At any stage of development,
the devices were actually carefully designed; the se-
curity claims of the authors were accepted as valid
by referees and colleagues. Neither now, nor at any
later time, will one be able to guarantee that the
devices in use are provably good. And it is certainly
not a good idea to close one’s eyes, invoke the laws
of physics and dump on them a responsibility they
cannot possibly bear.
D. On the use of security proofs
We conclude this section with yet another series of
concerns. Suppose for a moment that all the possi-
ble issues related to the implementation are under
control. Can one finally rest in peace and trust the
laws of physics? In principle one can, provided all
the assumptions, under which the security bounds
were derived, are fulfilled by the implementation.
Indeed, another dangerous shortcut consists in asso-
ciating “unconditional security” with “no assump-
tions”: no assumptions should be made on the power
of the eavesdropper, but assumptions must be made
on what Alice and Bob are doing. Here are a few
examples:
• Unconditional security bounds took some time
to reach those who were evaluating or im-
plementing practical schemes. The bounds
that finally percolated were plagued by a huge
assumption, of which very few people were
aware: the bounds were valid only in the limit
of infinitely long keys! Finite-key bounds had
already been addressed in some of the first se-
curity proofs [4, 13, 31]; such bounds are now
tractable and the whole community is aware of
the stringency of finite-key corrections [32].
• Security proofs always imply a modeling of
the detection process. For instance, almost all
the proofs in discrete-variable QKD are based
on an assumption called squashing: basically,
whether a detector ends up squashing all the
complexity of a state of the electromagnetic
field (the “real thing”) into a qubit (the thing
theorists work with). The validity of this as-
sumption was proved recently for the BB84
coding [33]; for other protocols, it remains an
assumption.
• The most general theoretical bounds can ac-
commodate all possible statistics. When
applied to the study of a practical setup,
however, simplifying assumptions are usually
made. For instance, we are aware of only one
proof, in which the detectors are allowed to
4have different efficiency, which is the case in
reality [34].
Ultimately, the suitable security bound for an im-
plementation cannot be found explicitly spelled out
in a theoretical paper; nor even in an experimental
paper reporting on a similar implementation. Those
papers should provide guidance, but each specific
setup must be the object of a dedicated study —
whence another element of trust creeps in: one must
trust the thoroughness of this dedicated study.
IV. PATHS FOR THE FUTURE
QKD has evolved from the dreams of childhood to
the seriousness of maturity. What is the next stage?
Sure enough, “only time will tell what we will do in
the future” [35]. But the facts sketched above, com-
bined with some tendencies within the QKD com-
munity, allow a guess of two directions in which the
field may evolve in the coming years.
A. Option 1: reasonable security of a device
Although they do not provide “security based only
on the laws of physics”, usual QKD devices provide a
quite reasonable level of security if implemented with
technical competence and without false complacency
on their “quantumness”. After all, couriers of classi-
cal information must also be trusted; once the trust
is there, QKD guarantees the incorruptibility of the
courier during its travel — a guarantee that classical
information cannot offer.
Here we have therefore a first possible stance: give
up claims of ultimate security, find a competitive
edge and try to produce devices than compare fa-
vorably with those operating with classical informa-
tion. It is our impression that some of main actors
in practical QKD have already taken this stance.
Apart from technological development, one of the
main challenges along the way will consist in find-
ing where exactly the competitive edge may lie — a
superficial survey of claims may suggest that long-
distance implementations are one of the goals, but
in fact QKD does not seem to be a viable solution
in that regime [36].
B. Option 2: device-independent security and
its price
Recently, some authors have come up with a new
class of QKD protocols that come as close as possi-
ble to the claim of “security based only on the laws
of physics”. The idea was already present in Ekert’s
1991 seminal paper [2], but went unnoticed for many
years. The key ingredient is that Bell’s theorem is
independent of quantum physics. As a consequence,
it is also independent of the details of the physi-
cal systems under study (its Hilbert space, its state,
the measurements that are performed). Therefore,
a protocol that estimates Eve’s information through
the amount of violation of a Bell-type inequality is
“device-independent” [37].
Of course, even the security of device-independent
protocols is not based only on the laws of physics;
however, it seems that only those requirements are
left that are strictly necessary: the eavesdropper
does not read your data, does not know which mea-
surements you are going to choose, and the like. A
comprehensive discussion can be found in Ref. [38].
What we want to highlight here is that this level of
security, arguably the most paranoid one can envis-
age, comes together with very stringent constraints.
As an example, we show how device-independent
protocols have an (almost) intrinsic limitation in
distance. This stems from the requirement that the
detection efficiency must be high enough to close
the so-called detection loophole. Indeed, as soon
as the fraction of detected pairs falls below a given
threshold, the observed violation of Bell-type in-
equality could have been created by pre-established
agreement: the devices may just contain computers
pre-programmed by the eavesdropper! In an imple-
mentation, being impossible to distinguish losses in
transmission from losses due to the quantum effi-
ciency of the detector, the threshold gives the value
of the tolerable total amount of losses.
How much is this threshold? A thorough study of
the detection loophole is missing, partly because the
classification of Bell’s inequalities is a hard task in
itself, and partly because the whole issue was con-
sidered of limited interest before the idea of device-
independent QKD came about. It is known that
there is no finite lower bound: there are explicit ex-
amples in which the detection loophole can be closed
with arbitrarily low efficiency [39]. However, these
examples use states of very large dimension d and
a number of measurements that is exponential in d.
For a QKD protocol to qualify as “practical”, the
number of measurements and of outcomes must be
kept “reasonable”. The set of inequalities with few
measurements and few outcomes has been studied
in great detail (though not in its fullness) and, in
those cases, the detection threshold is always found
well above 50% [40]. For definiteness therefore, let
us take the value of 50% for the threshold of total
detection efficiency [41].
InGaAs photodetectors in the telecom wavelength
range have efficiencies below 30% even under the
most optimistic specifications; none of the imple-
mentation using those detectors can therefore be
used for device-independent security. Depending on
the trust into manufacturer specifications, setups us-
ing Silicon-APD may just about reach the thresh-
old on the detector side, but then almost no losses
5can be tolerated in the channel. Assuming detectors
with 100% efficiency [42], fiber-optical transmission
channels without any interconnect losses and with
the usually quoted (optimistic) attenuation coeffi-
cient of 0.18 dB/km would limit a direct QKD link
to a distance of 16 km.
This issue of the distance has been presented as
an example of how stringent the requirements for
device-independent security may be. If we believe
that history repeats itself, further scrutiny will lead
to identifying further limitations of these very re-
cent protocols. In other words, it may be premature
to attach any practical value to device-independent
QKD; whence the second possible stance that we en-
visage for the coming years: focus on developing the
tools (both theoretical and experimental) required
to demonstrate the ultimate level of security, leaving
aside, at least temporarily, all claims of usefulness.
V. CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the evidence of the fact that QKD
guarantees security based on the laws of physics pro-
vided the implementation is perfect, or more pre-
cisely, provided all the imperfections of the imple-
mentation have been characterized and their effect
is accounted for. Since a thorough check of all pos-
sible leakage channels is impossible, the security of
any specific implementation of QKD will always be
based on some elements of trust. Expressions like
“security based only on the laws of physics” or “un-
conditional security” are convenient among experts,
as part of their technical jargon; but when they
leak out to larger audiences, they almost invari-
ably convey the wrong message (the same is true for
“device-independent”, though fortunately this ex-
pression has not reached the general public yet).
Specifically, we argued that the level of trust for
usual QKD protocols, like BB84, is not very differ-
ent from the one demanded of a “trusted courier”
carrying classical information. Protocols based on
Bell’s inequalities minimize the number of elements
of trust but come with very stringent requirements.
Twenty-five years after BB84, the field of QKD
seems on the point of splitting in two directions:
(i) the development of prototypes optimized for the
needs of niche tasks and guaranteeing a “reasonable”
level of security; (ii) the quest for demonstrating the
most paranoid level of security, leaving aside, at least
temporarily, the claim of practical usefulness.
Note added in proof: this text reflects the state
of practical QKD in 2009, i.e. on the 25th anniver-
sary of the BB84 protocol. Among the progresses in
the last two years, two are worth at least mention-
ing. First, complete hacking of QKD systems has
been reported, exploiting a loophole in the hardware,
which can be closed [43, 44]. Second, methods have
been suggested that would avoid the distance limi-
tation in device-independent QKD [45, 46]. While
it is too early to assess the practical value of these
methods, it is encouraging to see that, when the real
challenges are clearly spelled out, the inventiveness
of physicists rises to meet them.
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